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Abstract 
The anthropogenic climate change presents a global challenge that threatens 
human  survival.  Paradoxically,  this  global  catastrophe     provides  huge 
economic opportunities in the form of the Arctic Treasure Hunt with strategic 
interactions: an estimated quarter of Earth’s oil reserves are to lie under the 
glaciers of the North Pole. In this paper, we use game-theoretic models to 
characterize the strategic interactions for different management regimes of the 
Arctic Treasure Hunt.  Non-cooperative games are used to describe scenarios 
of  sole  management  regime  and  characteristic  function  games  those  of 
cooperation in the form of joint management regime. 
 
Keywords: characteristic function games, exclusive economic zones, game theory, oil reserves, 
management regimes, North Pole, supermodular games. 
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1.  Introduction 
In the 1980s, Young (1986) perceived the strategic importance of the Arctic Circle and declared the 
Age of the Arctic. Little has been seen of this prediction. However, the current global warming 
coupled with high and volatile international oil prices renews the quest for the Age of the Arctic 
with huge economic and strategic interests. For centuries, the North Pole has been considered an 
international common property resource of no significant economic value. With global warming, 
the Arctic region is expected to become more accessible. For instance, the Northern Sea Route 
(NSR) is estimated to reduce travelling distance from Europe to North America, Northeast Asia and 
Far East by 40% (Yenikeyeff and Krysiek, 2007).  Paradoxically, the danger posed by the global 
warming at the Arctic is also creating one of the treasure hunts of this century: the so-called Arctic 
Treasure Hunt. This could eventually lead to easier access to natural resources that have, according 
to some estimates, turned out to be enormous. According to the US Geological Survey a quarter of 
Earth’s oil reserves are under the glaciers of the North Pole. In addition, gas reserves, some bacteria 
and shipping routes are hoped to add economic benefits. 
 
Hoping to take advantage of these benefits, Russia, Norway, Denmark, Canada and the United 
States  have laid  claims  on the  North  Pole. These claims  seek to  extend the territories of  each 
country beyond the 200 nautical miles defined by the United Nations Convention on Laws of the 
Sea. These claims are consistent with the United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea which 
allows countries to claim more only if they can prove their continental shelf extends further into the 
sea. Although each of the countries has justifiable reasons for claiming parts of the region, some of 
the claims lack credibility. What is common among each country’s aspirations is the expectation of 
economic gains. Some could even call these aspirations as imperialism. 
   2 
The competition  between the five  littoral  countries  involves  strategic interaction, which further 
complicates the analysis of the situation. The methodology used in game theory can offer an insight 
into the problem and greatly simplify the analysis. Game theory can be divided into two main 
categories: cooperative and non-cooperative. Both of these are applicable in the Arctic Treasure 
Hunt.  
Russia claims that the 1240 mile underwater Lomonosov Ridge in the Arctic is connected to East 
Siberia and therefore is a part of its continental shelf. In addition to the Lomonosov Ridge, Canada 
has also laid claims to the North West Passage. Canada first claimed the passage in the early 1970s. 
The Russian and Canadian claims are being strongly contested by the others. The Danes argue that 
the Lomonosov Ridge is connected to Greenland. Since America has not ratified the 1982 Law of 
the Sea Convention (LOSC) they cannot stake a claim. Rather they assert that the North West 
Passage is international waters. Although the present claims are in the form of sole management 
regimes, there is likelihood of multilateral (or joint) management regime. According to the Law of 
the Sea Convention, in addition to a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), signatories may also 
claim as additional territory any extensions to their continental shelves that they can scientifically 
substantiate. Russia, Denmark and Canada all claim that the Lomonosov Ridge is natural extension 
from  their  continental  shelves,  so  the  claims  are  overlapping.  Also,  financial  resources  and 
technology will impose significant constraints to enable joint claims to be credible. There might 
also be an agreement for joint exploration. Both these scenarios would depend on the desire for 
compromise and co-operation between the various parties. 
One  notable  development  of  the  Arctic  Treasure  Hunt  is  the  formation  of  coalitions,  which 
obviously implies cooperation. Norway has been reported to be willing to form a coalition with 
Russia (Yenikeyeff and Krysiek, 2007): this is because the Norwegian expertise and capital would 
be required by Russia in the exploration of the Arctic if Russia receives all the land it has claimed.   3 
In addition, Anglo-American companies such as Exxon operated in Russia on the Sakhalin-1 oil and 
gas project in the Russian Far East. Therefore, the coalition between Russia and America is also 
feasible. Exxon has operated in Canadian territories before, so a US-Canada coalition is plausible. 
EU can also harmonise its Arctic strategy thus promoting a coalition among European contenders to 
the  Arctic  Treasure  Hunt.  The  main  battle  is  now  among  US,  Russia,  Denmark,  Norway  and 
Canada. It is thus imperative to study various coalitional structures of this game. This can be done 
with the help of characteristic function games (CFG), developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944). 
 
The formation of one or more coalitions is viable if the countries believe that cooperation benefits 
them. In the event that cooperation is not an option, there a few other courses of action that can take 
place. First, a two-stage non-cooperation game may be used. Here, the countries choose the optimal 
investment and land claim in the first stage, and compete in the second stage. Second, the non-
cooperative game can be characterized in terms of supermodular games. The problem that we seek 
to address with supermodular games is similar to the arms race (e.g., Hendricks  & Kovenock, 
1989). The theoretical insight from arms race indicates that the perceived value of additional arms 
to  a  country  depends  on  military  capability  of  the  adversary.  Consider  the  following  example: 
Russia goes to the Arctic Circle to gather evidence to support its claim to the Arctic Circle. The 
scientific  expedition  of  Russia  boosts  similar  sentiments  among  other  contenders,  creating 
incentives to pursue similar scientific expeditions. Typically, there are strategic complementarities. 
Supermodular optimization has been extended to analyse games with strategic complementarities 
(Topkis, 1979; Vives, 1990; and Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).  
 
Uncertainties  will  also  determine  the  profitability  of  the  Arctic  Treasure  Hunt.  According  to 
Yenikeyeff and Krysiek (2007)  the present estimates are made under current oil and gas price   4 
conditions.  Therefore,  the  future  of  the  Arctic  shelf  development  will  be  determined  by  the 
dynamics of world oil prices in the next twenty years. 
 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  use  game-theoretic  models  to  offer  insight  into  the  strategic 
interaction among these Arctic countries that compete in the Arctic Treasure Hunt. However, the 
scope  of  this  paper  is  extended  only  to  an  overall  introduction  of  the  three  types  of  games 
mentioned above. Later work is required to estimate the possible outcomes for each type of games. 
Especially interesting results could be yielded from studying coalitions. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. The initial stage concerning the policy a country decides to 
adopt is presented in the next section. There are several factors e.g. world oil prices, the distribution 
of oil at the Arctic, and the response of the international community that affect this decision. The 
third section contains the various game-theoretic formulations for different management regimes for 
the Arctic Treasure Hunt. The conclusions are presented in the final section.  
 
2.  First Stage 
The initial set-up of the situation is one characterised by uncertainty about the oil deposits. There is 
no prior knowledge about how the oil is distributed at the Arctic, and no competing country is more 
knowledgeable than the others. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume two scenarios. In the first 
one, the oil is distributed across the whole area such that individual deposits are not connected to 
each other. In this case, the countries would want to conquer as much land as possible in order to 
maximize the oil reserves in their possession. Thus, rapid expansionism secures a greater amount of 
land. 
 
   5 
In the second scenario, the oil is distributed evenly across the North Pole with all pockets of oil 
connected to each other by tunnels. Alternatively, the North Pole oil reserves can be thought to be 
merely one large deposit. This means that the competing countries would have to come up with a 
way  to  share  the  oil  and  benefit  from  it  collectively.  Thus,  coalitions  are  possible.  This 
simplification is done despite the fact that most likely neither of these extreme states of nature 
would  occur.  However,  the  extreme  cases  can  help  demonstrate  behavior  at  both  ends  of  the 
behavioral spectrum. 
 
The actual state of nature was determined during the formation of the Earth. This constitutes the 
first stage of the game. However, there is uncertainties about the true state of nature since the 
players are not aware of  the true state of the nature; this is built into the first stage of the game. . In 
this kind of a first stage, country i has to decide whether or not it is worth making additional 
territorial claims in an uncertain world. Uncertainty also arises from the fact that a country cannot 
know if investing in aggressive imperialism will be accepted by the international community, which 
might result in annulment.  
 
A country has two policy options: first, settle with the amount of land designated to it according to 
the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Sea that states that a state has sole exploitation rights over 
all natural resources within a 200-nautical mile zone that extends from its coastline. If the country 
can prove that its continental shelf extends another 150 nautical miles, it can claim the right to 
exploit the natural resources.  
 
Although  this  approach  of  moderate  diplomacy  causes  little  friction  in  the  political  realm,  it 
possesses its own weakness. There is a risk that another country can take advantage of the second 
option. That is, that despite the existing 200-nautical mile law, it chooses to aggressively claim   6 
more land, and if the international community agrees to that and oil is in small pockets, it will gain 
more  land  than  with  the  moderate  approach.  There  are  risks,  however.  If  the  international 
community does not agree with the country’s claims, its investment in establishing the claim, and 
costs associated with search and military forces will have been made in vain. 
 
The main aim of each country is to maximize profit. It does so by choosing the optimal policy and 
the level of extraction. Factors that affect the decision-making process include the world’s total oil 
reserves (Y ), the size of the North Pole’s oil reserves ( z ), the market price of crude oil ( ) , ( Y x p , 
costs associated with search and extraction (c ), and the strategies of a country and its competitors, 
i s  and  i s  for  5 ,..., 2 , 1 i  and  S A M, . 
 
The price of oil is here simplified to be determined by the amount of oil in the market and expected 
oil reserves. The more oil there is in the market, the lower the price. Similarly, larger estimated oil 
reserves correspond with a lower oil price. Thus, ( , ) p p x Y . 
 
Initially, a country has to make a choice between a moderate and aggressive policy. 
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where   expresses the perceived probability that the international community will condemn the 
hostile land claims. According to equation (1) when the country i chooses a moderate policy and the   7 
international community does not condemn hostile land claims the payoff of player i is zero. Simply 
put, the country will choose the policy that maximizes its expected profits: 
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The significance of this first-stage decision-making for the remainder of the game, regardless of 
which of the following three paths the game proceeds in, is that it affects the portion of the Arctic 
that each country will possess. 
 
 
3.  Second Stage 
After the initial stage, several possible scenarios arise depending on the state of nature, propensity 
to cooperate and attitudes towards risk. 
 
3.1.  Scenario I: Non-cooperative Game 
Non-cooperative games are probably the simplest forms of games. Despite of this, even the famous 
prisoner’s dilemma can reveal a lot about strategic behaviour. However, at its most basic form, the 
prisoner’s dilemma is a static game. We are more concerned about the dynamic games which offer 
an opportunity to study behaviour over time. Non-cooperative games are important in describing 
competition and how one country’s decisions affect and are affected by other countries’ decisions. 
Furthermore, the optimal strategy can be determined. This, of course, requires that rational choice is 
assumed. 
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In the game there are  5 n  players (i.e., the five competing countries). Each player maximizes its 
own economic gains from the resource by choosing its strategy. The outcome of the game – once 
again, assuming rationality – is a Nash equilibrium with all countries choosing optimal strategies. 
 
Different approaches could be used to characterise the equilibrium with the choice among different 
approaches depending on the assumption about the players’ commitment to future actions. The 
examples  include  modeling  the  players  as  choosing  path  strategies  and  search  for  the  Nash 
equilibria  (NE);  and  another  being  the  use  of  the  Subgame  Perfect  Nash  equilibria  (SPNE). 
However,  strategic  complementarities  among  the  five  players  make  the  problem  different;  and 
Simaan and Cruz (1975) formulate the strategic complementarities version of this game. The choice 
of  path  strategies  assumes  that  commitments  extend  over  the  entire  future  horizon  whilst  the 
decision rule strategies assume that no commitments are possible. Both approaches have been used 
to  analyse  non-renewable  resources.    Among  the  studies  that  use  the  path  strategies  for  non-
renewable natural resources are Crawford, et al. (1984) and Dasgupta and Heal (1995The solution 
for this game can be closed-loop or the open-loop controls. 
 
Countries  1,2,...,5 i  are engaged in non-cooperative extraction of Arctic oil pool. The discount 
rate is given as  r . The objective for each country is to choose the optimal extraction path that  will  
maximize the present value of its profits given the extraction path of other countries. Following 
Dasgupta and Heal (1995) coupled with symmetry assumption, the extraction path of each player 
will be given as: 
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  0 i  for  0 it y ,  1,2,...,5. i  The Nash equilibrium is the solution to the above equation. 
Summing the above equation for the five players: 
 
' 5 ,
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i
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The  Nash  solution  is  a  reasonable  simplification  for  the  non-cooperative  game.  The  Nash 
equilibrium  of  the  problem  in  a  differential  game  can  take  two  forms  depending  on  players’ 
commitment to future extraction rates. In the open-loop form, the only argument of 
*
i y  is time: 
*( ). i yt This means each player determines its optimal extraction rate at  0 t . Simaan and Cruz 
(1975) distinguish between the closed-loop form and open-loop controls. However, in the optimal 
control  problem  both  the  open-loop  and  closed-loop  forms  coincide  because  of  the  Bellman’s 
principle of optimality. The above strategic interaction between players can be formulated as a 
game. 
 
A normal form game with n players is represented by a triple  ) , , ( i u S N .  N  is a finite or 
infinite  set  of  n  players.  n S   is  the  strategy  set  available  to  the  players  N n   such  that 
n S S S ... 1 . The typical element of each player’s strategy set  n S  is  n s  while  n s  denotes the 
competitors’  strategies.  Thus,  the  complete  strategy  profile  is  S s s s n n ) , ( .  u   is  a  payoff 
function  that  can  be  represented  by  a  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  correspondence 
S ui : .  
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Given the description of the game above, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is defined as: 
 
DEFINITION: A strategy profile  12 , ,..., I s s s s  constitutes a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of 
the game  , , . N i i N S u  if for every  1,2,..., , iN  
' ,, i i i i i i u s s u s s , 
' . ii sS  
 
In Nash equilibrium, each player strategy choice is the best response to the strategies actually 
played by his rivals.  
 
It is also possible to extend the concept of Nash equilibrium to situations where the players 
randomise over their pure strategies. The definition of mixed strategy equilibrium is given as: 
 
DEFINITION: A mixed strategy profile  1,..., N  constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game 
, , . N i i N S u  if for every  1,2,..., , iN  
' ,, i i i i i i uu , 
' . ii S  
 
The symmetry assumption is quite strong: players  could differ in many  important respects e.g. 
technology and efficiency in resource extraction. There are possibilities of dominant player in this 
instance and the Stackelberg solution concept is required. 
 
 
Being naïve, a country could wait until the rest of the oil producing countries (including OPEC) 
have emptied their oil reserves, and begin to monopolize the oil markets. This would lead to an 
exorbitant oil price. A less naïve view is that a backstop technology will ultimately be available. In 
this case, it is less desirable to hoard oil until the end since by then a replacement could have been 
invented, thus making oil obsolete and plummeting the oil price.    11 
3.2.  Scenario II: Supermodular Games 
In this type of scenario, the oil reserves at the North Pole are formed by a single deposit. Simply 
put, extracting oil from one part of the deposit will lower the oil level in all parts of the deposit. The 
reason for assuming a single deposit is merely for the sake of simplicity. This leads to a dilemma 
each country has to face: whether or not to form a coalition with other countries. Let us now assume 
that for some reason no coalitions are formed. 
 
A country can choose to be selfish and drill oil at the highest possible rate, knowing very well that if 
the others do the same, then it will lose out on potential oil production. The end result will be that 
the oil is drilled and the stock is depleted rapidly. As Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) point out, if 
the players believe that the single pool of oil  is  large, then too  much drilling  will take place. 
Considering that the oil reserves of the North Pole constitute an estimated quarter of the world’s 
total reserves, this rapid drilling could be a very reasonable simplification. 
 
Here, supermodular games are appropriate to characterise the strategic interaction. Supermodular 
games are applicable when there are complementarities in strategy space. For example, consider the 
nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet Union: both increased the number of their 
nuclear weapons as a response to the increase done by the other. In a sense, each additional weapon 
is  more  important  than  the  previous.  Similarly,  in  the  Arctic  Treasure  Hunt  if  the  competing 
countries -i increase their production, country i’s utility (payoff) will increase if it does the same. 
 
A normal form game with n players is represented by a triple  ) , , ( i u S N .  N  is a finite or 
infinite  set  of  n  players.  n S   is  the  strategy  set  available  to  the  players  N n   such  that 
n S S S ... 1 .  The  typical  element  of  each  player’s  strategy  set  n S   is  n s   while  n s   denotes 
competitors’  strategies.  Thus,  the  complete  strategy  profile  is  S s s s n n ) , ( .  u   is  a  payoff   12 
function  that  can  be  represented  by  a  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  function  S ui : . 
Following Milgrom and Roberts (1990), the game’s solution is as follows. 
 
The game is supermodular if the following conditions hold for all  N n : 
 
(A1)   The strategy set S  is a complete lattice. 
(A2)  n u  is supermodular in  n s  (for fixed  n s ). 
(A3)  n u  has increasing differences in  n s  and  n s . 
(A4)   } { : S un   is  order  upper  semi -continuous  in  n s   (for  fixed  n s )  and  order 
continuous in  n s  (for fixed  n s ) and has a finite upper bound. 
 
Often the above conditions can be checked by using the theorem below that closely resembles the 
above conditions. 
 
THEOREM 1: Suppose the number of players is finite, that the typical strategy for each player n  is 
n k
n nj k j s ) ,..., 1 ; (   and  that  the  ordering  is  component-wise.  Then,    is  supermodular  if 
assumptions (A1’) – (A4’) hold: 
 
(A1’)  n S  is an interval in 
n k :  } | { ] , [ n n n n n y s y s y y S . 
(A2’)  n u  is twice continuously differentiable on  n S . 
(A3’)  0 /
2
nj ni n s s u  for all n  and for all  n k j i 1 . 
(A4’)  0 /
2
mj ni n s s u  for all  m n ,  n k i 1  and  m k j 1 . 
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The  main  characteristic  of  supermodular  games  follows  directly  from  Topkis’s  monotonicity 
theorem. Each player’s best-response correspondence has extremal selections that are increasing in 
each rival’s strategy, s
–i. Therefore, the overall best response mapping has extremal selections that 
are increasing. The existence of a fixed point in either of these selections is a result from Tarski’s 
fixed-point theorem. A fixed point implies a pure strategy equilibrium – a Nash equilibrium. 
 
A pure Nash equilibrium is a tuple  ) ; ( N n s s n  such that each  n s  maximizes  ) , ˆ ( n n x x f . By 
definition,  any  pure  Nash  equilibrium  may  be  a  mixed  equilibrium  as  well  as  a  correlated 
equilibrium. The sets of strategies  m m S S  (with  N m ,..., 1 ) are rationalizable if for all  n  and 
n n S x ,  n x  maximizes  )] , ( [ n x f E  for some probability distribution on  n x  with support in  n S . 
Furthermore, to be rationalizable, a strategy must belong to a rationalizable set. 
 
A strategy  n x  is strongly dominated by another pure strategy  n x ˆ  if  ) , ˆ ( ) , ( n n n n x x f x x f  for all 
n x . Thus, it is rational to choose a dominating strategy over any dominated strategies. Given a 
product  set  S ˆ   of  strategy  profiles,  the  set  of  n ’s  undominated  responses  to  S ˆ   is  defined  by 
)} ˆ , ' ( ) ˆ , ( ) ˆ ˆ )( ' ( | { ) ˆ ( n n n n n n n n n n n x x f x x f S x S x S x S U .  Denote  the  list  of  undominated 
responses for each player by  ) ); ˆ ( ( ) ˆ ( N n S U S U n . Furthermore, let  ) ˆ (S U  denote the interval 
))] ˆ ( sup( )), ˆ ( [inf( S U S U . 
 
U  may be used to represent the iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies. Let us define 
S S
0  as the full set of strategy profiles, and  ) (
1 S U S  for  1. For all  , a strategy  n x  is 
serially undominated if   ) (S U x n n . These are the strategies that survive the iteration of strongly 
dominated strategies. This has significant importance since only the surviving serially undominated   14 
strategies are rationalizable and can be played with a positive probability at both a pure and mixed 
Nash  equilibrium  as  well  as  at  a  correlated  equilibrium.  The  remaining  strategies  form  the 
dominance solution. If, at the end, there exists only one strategy that has survived iteration, the 
game is called dominance solvable. All serially undominated strategies lie in an interval  ] , [ x x  with 
supremum and infimum points being the largest and smallest Nash equilibria respectively. 
 
 
3.3.  Scenario III: Characteristic Function Games 
The previous two scenarios dealt with non-cooperative games. Characteristic function games, on the 
other hand, are concerned with cooperation and specifically which coalitions should be formed. A 
coalition is a subset of players that has the right to make binding agreements with one another. 
Usually it is assumed that any subset of players can do this. In the Arctic Treasure Hunt game, 
characteristic  function  games  allow  us  to  study  which  combination  of  players  would  yield  the 
greatest utility or profits. Characteristic function games have been applied to various industries with 
cooperation. Lindroos and Kaitala (2000) and Kronbak and Lindroos (2006) have studied coalitions 
in  fisheries.  Applications  of  characteristic  function  games  in  other  areas  include  regional 
cooperation in investments in electric power among four states in India Gately (1974). Horvat and 
Bogataj (1999) apply the characteristic function to analyse interactions between business decision 
units. Mesterton-Gibbons (2001) provides interesting applications in car pool, log hauling, antique 
dealing and team long-jumping. 
 
We assume that utility is transferable, i.e., that the payoffs attainable by any particular coalition 
(subset of N) consist of all individual payoffs that sum to no more than a particular number. When 
utility is transferable, it is possible to compare the utilities of different players, for instance, in 
monetary terms. In describing the characteristic function games we follow Friedman (1991)   15 
                                                                               
Let  } ,..., 2 , 1 { n N  denote  the  set  of  players  in  a characteristic  function game.  If  coalitions  are 
formed, they are denoted by K, L, M and so forth. The lower case letters denote the number of 
players: K has k players, L has l players and M has m players. For example, suppose  20 n  and 
} 13 , 6 , 3 , 1 { K . Then  4 k . 
 
DEFINITION: A coalition is a subset of the set of players,  N , that is able to make a binding 
agreement. 
 
In characteristic function games the actual strategies recede into the background. Instead, attention 
is given to what payoffs the players and coalitions are able to achieve for themselves. These can be 
characterized with the help of characteristic functions which can be defined as follows. 
 
DEFINITION: The transferable utility characteristic function of a game having the set of players 
N is  a  scalar  valued  function,  ) (K v ,  that  associates  R K v ) (   with  each  N K .  The 
characteristic function value for the empty coalition is 0. That is,  0 ) ( v . 
 
We interpret  ) (K v  as the maximum payoff to members of the coalition K that the coalition can 
secure for itself. We adopt the so-called α-characteristic function approach, which describes what a 
player/coalition can guarantee himself/itself when the remaining players act to minimize his/its 
payoff.  The  α-characteristic  function  is  defined  as  follows.  Let  ) , , ( i u S N   be  the  game  in 
strategic form. The joint strategy space of the players in a coalition K is  i K i
K S S . Elements of 
K S  are denoted 
K s . Let  ) t \ ( i s  denote the strategy combination in which player  i  is using  i s  if 
K i  and  i t  if  K i .   16 
 
Each player can be certain that his payoff does not exceed his maximin value in the game. This can 
be imagined to be a situation in which the remaining players form a coalition with the sole purpose 
of minimizing the payoff of player i . Hence, the largest payoff that player i  can secure for himself 
is 
 
) t \ ( i min max s P y i
S s S t
i
K K
i i
 
 
Each coalition aims to maximize its payoff. Thus, the α-characteristic function is 
 
K i
K) t \ ( ) ( min max s P K v i
S s S t K K K K
 
 
An important assumption of the characteristic function games is that they are superadditive. This 
means that coalitions can achieve at least as much as the sum of what their members can achieve. If 
K and L are subsets of N with  L K Ø, then  ) ( ) ( ) ( L v K v L K v . 
 
ASSUMPTION: The characteristic function,  ) (K v , for a game  ) , , ( i u S I  is superadditive. That 
is, for any disjoint coalitions, K and L contained in n,  ) ( ) ( ) ( L v K v L K v . 
 
It is worth mentioning that it is convenient to refer to the characteristic function and the set of 
players as (N,v) instead of using  ) , , ( i u S N  since actual strategies recede into the background. 
The reason for this is that  ) , ( v N  contains all the required information. 
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DEFINITION:  For transferable utility games,  the characteristic function  form  of  a game, also 
called the coalitional form, is given by  ) , ( v N . It is characterized by the set of players, N, and 
the characteristic function, v. 
 
An imputation is a payoff vector that gives each player at least as much as he could guarantee 
himself  and  gives  all  players  together  v(N).  The  set  of  imputations  is  a  set  that  contains  all 
reasonable outcomes – certain payoff vectors – for a cooperative game. 
 
DEFINITION: A payoff vector, 
n R x , is an imputation in the game  ) , ( v N  if  i i u x  for all 
N i   (i.e.,  x  is  individually  rational)  and  ) (N v x
N i
i   (i.e., x is group rational). The set of 
imputations is denoted I(N,v). 
 
With a basic understanding of some of the essentials of characteristic function games, it is time to 
introduce some solution concepts of them, namely the core, the nucleolus and the Shapley value. 
Characteristic function games are convenient because they can often produce results with relatively 
little technical rigour.  
 
The core is at the heart of cooperative games, dating back over a century. Edgeworth (1881) was the 
first to discuss it in economics literature. The core is a set of trades that cannot be ruled out as final 
trades. Put in another way, the core is a set of plausible equilibria. In these equilibria, each trader 
has a level of utility that is at least as great as the utility gained from acting alone. 
 
DEFINITION: Let C(N,v) be the core of a game  ) , ( v N . The core is a subset of the set of 
imputations consisting of the imputations that are not dominated. 
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Therefore, the core cannot reveal any precise answer to a problem. The nucleolus, on the other 
hand, is generally unique and consists of a single imputation. A payoff vector is in the nucleolus if 
the excesses for all coalitions for that payoff vector are made as small as possible. If the core is not 
empty, the nucleolus belongs to the core. More formally, 
 
DEFINITION: The nucleolus of a game (N,v) is the imputation that minimizes the function θ(x) in 
the lexicographic order. (Vector α is lexicographically smaller than β if  l l  for  k I 1  and 
k k .) 
 
The last solution concept introduced in this paper is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). It can be 
calculated for any superadditive game in characteristic function form that has a finite number of 
players. It has a wonderful quality of satisfying both individual and group rationality. The payoff of 
each player is the weighted average of the contribution that he makes to the coalition he belongs to. 
The weighted payoff depends on the number of players in the coalition and the total number of 
players in the game. 
 
Let  ) (v  denote the Shapley value. The Shapley value payoff for player i is 
 
( 1)!( )!
( ) ) ) ( \ i )
!
i
KN
k n k
v v K v K
n
 
 
There are four conditions that characterize the Shapley value, each included in the above equation. 
These conditions are (a) group rationality, 
N i i N v v ) ( ) ( ; (b) if player i no more than v({i}) to 
any coalition, then i receives only v({i}); (c) if two games are identical except for the order in 
which the players are listed, then the Shapley values for the players are the same; (d) if a game is   19 
formed by adding two games together, the Shapley value of the new game is the sum of the values 
of the two original games. 
 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
Game theory is a useful tool in describing the strategic interaction of the Arctic Treasure Hunt. It 
can be applied to situations with and without cooperation, and can yield useful results for policy-
makers. Although this paper makes several simplifying assumptions, including the distribution of 
oil and policy choices of countries, it highlights the fact that no country can plan ahead without 
considering the strategies of other countries. 
 
While the scope of this paper is limited to the theoretic modeling of the problem, future research 
can offer important applicable results. For example, it would be interesting to determine which 
coalitions  are  desirable  when using real  data.  As was  mentioned in  the  introduction, there has 
already been speculation that some of the countries might combine their forces and work together in 
order to gain extra benefits. 
 
It would also be interesting to consider how a grand coalition might contemplate on competing with 
OPEC  if  the  Arctic  oil  reserves  do  end  up  being  as  enormous  as  estimated.  This  could  have 
significant  consequences  on  the  price  of  crude  oil.  Also,  it  is  worth  noting  that  some  of  the 
competing countries (Russia, the United States and Norway) are already major players in the oil 
industry. 
 
However, it would be foolhardy to rush into decisions just based on the few game-theoretic models 
presented in this paper. The time-frame for the Arctic Treasure Hunt is long, and in the next 50 or   20 
100  years  major  technological  breakthroughs  may  take  place,  dwarfing  oil’s  role  as  the  most 
important energy source. This is one of the many factors that the models in this paper do not 
account  for,  and  that  could  bring  additional  headache  for  decision-makers.  Is  it  rational  for  a 
country to, for instance, refrain from drilling oil in the hope of making a much greater profit later 
when the oil fields of other countries have dried up and the oil price has sky-rocketed? What if an 
alternative fuel is invented before that? When is such an alternative energy source expected to be 
invented and should funds be channelled to that rather than to the Artic Treasure Hunt? 
 
Acknowledgements: 
We are very grateful to Pedro Pintasilgo and Marko Lindroos for their comments.  The second 
author is also grateful to Nordic Marine Academy and Sida for financial support. 
 
References 
Crawford, V. P., Sobel, J. & Takahashi, I. (1984). Bargaining, Strategic Reserves and International 
Trade in Exhaustible Resource. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 66 (4), 472 -480. 
 
Dasgupta P. S. & Heal, G. M. (1995). Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press).  
 
Edgeworth, F.Y. (1881). Mathematical Physics. (London: Kegan Paul). 
 
Eswaran, M. & Lewis, T. (1985). Exhaustible Resources and Alternative Equilibrium Concepts. 
Canadian Journal of Economics, XVII (3), 459 – 473.  
   21 
Friedman,  J.W.  (1991).  Game  Theory  with  Applications  to  Economics.  (New  York:  Oxford 
University Press). 
 
Gately, D. (1974). Sharing the gains from regional cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to 
Planning Investment in Electric Market, International Economic Review, 15 (1), 195 – 208.  
 
Guth,  W.  (1988).  Game  theory  and  the  nuclear  arms  race  -  The  strategic  position  of  Western 
Europe, European Journal of Political Economy, 4, 245-261. 
 
Hendricks, K. & Kovenock,  D. 1(989). Asymmetric Information, Information Externalities, and 
Efficiency: The Case of Oil Exploration. The RAND Journal of Economics, 20, 164-182. 
 
Hoffman, E., Marsden, J. & Siadi, R. (1991). Are joint bidding and competitive common value 
auctions  markets  compatible  -  Some  Evidence  from  Offshore  Oil  Auctions,  Journal  of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 20, 99 – 112. 
 
Horvat, L. & Bogataj, L. (1999). A market game with the characteristic function according to MRP 
and input-output analysis model. International Journal of Production Economics, 59 (1999), 281 – 
288. 
 
Kronbak,  L.  G.  &  Lindroos,  M.  (2006).  An  Enforcement-Coalition  Model:  Fishermen  and 
Authorities Forming Coalitions. Environmental & Resource Economics, 35, 169 – 194. 
 
Lindroos M. & Kaitala V. (2000). Nash Equilibria in a Coalition Game of the Norwegian Spring-
spawning Herring Fishery. Marine Resource Economics, 15, 321 – 340.    22 
Mesterton-Gibbons,  M.  (2001).  An  Introduction  to  Game  Theoretic  Modelling.  2
nd  edition, 
(Providence: American Mathematical Association).  
 
Milgrom,  P.  &  Roberts,  J.  (1990).  Rationalizability,  learning  and  equilibrium  in  games  with 
strategic complementarities, Economica, 58, 1255 – 1278. 
 
Shapley, L.S. (1953). A value for n-person games. (In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), 
Annals of mathematics studies (pp. 307 – 317). Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
 
Simaan,  M.  &  Cruz,  J.  B.  (1975).  Formulation  of  Richardson’s  Model  of  Arms  Race  from  a 
Differential Game Viewpoint. Review of Economic Studies, 42 (1), 67 -77. 
 
Topkis,  D.  (1979).  Equilibrium  points  in  nonzero-sum  n-person  submodular  games.  Journal  of 
Control and Optimization, 17, 773 – 787. 
 
Vives,  X.  (1990).  Nash  equilibrium  with  strategic  complementarities.  Journal  of  Mathematical 
Economics, 19, 305 -321. 
 
von  Neumann,  J.  &  Morgenstern,  O.  (1944).  Theory  of  Games  and  Economic  Behavior. 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). 
 
Yenikeyeff, S. M. & Krysiek, T. F. (2007). The Battle for next Energy Frontier: The Russian Polar 
Expedition and the Future of Arctic Hydrocarbons, Oxford Energy Comment, August 2007. 
 
Young, O. R. (1986). The Age of the Arctic. Foreign Policy, 61, 160 – 179.  